



---

The Stoic Categories

Author(s): Margaret E. Reesor

Reviewed work(s):

Source: *The American Journal of Philology*, Vol. 78, No. 1 (1957), pp. 63-82

Published by: [The Johns Hopkins University Press](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/291991>

Accessed: 19/06/2012 06:13

---

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at  
<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



*The Johns Hopkins University Press* is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The American Journal of Philology*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

## THE STOIC CATEGORIES.

In spite of the important work on the Stoic categories which has been done by Rieth, De Lacy, and Pohlenz, and the excellent monograph on Stoic Logic by Mates, I feel that certain aspects of the topic can be still further elaborated.<sup>1</sup> So far as I know, the names of the four categories, substratum (*ὑποκείμενον*) qualified (*ποιός*), disposition (*πὼς ἔχον*), and relative disposition (*πρὸς τί πὼς ἔχον*), are not listed together in any writers earlier than Simplicius and Plotinus.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, these late writers provide little evidence for their use. The categories, however, are found separately in various fragments of Zeno, Aristo, and Chrysippus. This in itself is not surprising since Chrysippus was the founder of Stoic Logic, and the philosophers of the Middle and New Stoa were concerned almost entirely with Ethics. The first part of my paper will deal with problems related to the use of the categories by the Old Stoa; the second part will include an analysis of the relevant passages in Simplicius and Plotinus.

Very little evidence related to the four categories is to be found in the fragments of Zeno's philosophy. That "qualified" (*ποιός*) and "quality" (*ποιότης*), however, played some part in his Metaphysics can be seen from his etymology of the name of the Titan Coeus. A scholiast, who is dated by Flach to the first

<sup>1</sup> For further discussion of the Stoic categories see O. Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der Stoischen Ethik* (Berlin, 1933); P. De Lacy, "The Stoic Categories as Methodological Principles," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVI (1945), pp. 246-63; M. Pohlenz, "Die Begründung der abendländischen Sprachlehre durch die Stoa," *Gött. Nachr.*, III (1939), pp. 185-8; M. Pohlenz, "Zenon und Chrysipp," *Gött. Nachr.*, II (1938), pp. 182-5; M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, I (Göttingen, 1948), pp. 69-70 and II (Göttingen, 1949), pp. 39-42; B. Mates, *Stoic Logic* (Univ. of California Press, 1953). For the fragments of the Old Stoa I have used H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (Berlin, 1905), and I have referred to this collection by the number of the book and fragment e.g. II, 453. All references to Simplicius refer to C. Kalbfleisch, *Simplicii in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* (Berlin, 1907) and references to Plotinus to Plotini *Enneades*, II (Leipzig, 1884), edited by R. Volkmann.

<sup>2</sup> Simpl., *In Arist. Cat.*, 67, 1-2 = II, 369 and Plot., VI, 1, 25 = II, 371. Simplicius used as his source Porphyry's commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*. On this point see Rieth (above, note 1), p. 6.

century of this era, quotes Zeno as stating that the Titans were the elements of the universe, and Coeus was the quality (Κοῖον γὰρ λέγει τὴν ποιότητα κατὰ τροπὴν Αἰολικὴν τοῦ π πρὸς τὸ Κ).<sup>3</sup> We have his etymologies of the names of the other three Titans also. Creius is called the royal and ruling power, Hyperion the upward movement, and Iapetus the downward movement. Perhaps quality in this passage was synonymous with life or power. It seems probable also that he regarded the quality as inhering in a substratum since he referred to colors as the first configurations of matter (I, 91).

The concept of internal relation appears to be implicit in Zeno's treatment of the virtues.<sup>4</sup> Plutarch writes that Zeno recognized four virtues, wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice, and regarded them as several according to difference (πλείονας κατὰ διαφοράς) but inseparable (ἀχώριστοι, I, 200). He defined them in terms of wisdom (φρόνησις), and argued, for instance, that courage is wisdom in things to be endured, and justice is wisdom in things to be distributed (I, 200; cf. 201). They were one virtue, seeming to differ according to their powers in relation to external entities (ὡς μίαν οὔσαν ἀρετὴν, ταῖς δὲ πρὸς τὰ πράγματα σχέσει κατὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας διαφέρειν δοκοῦσαν, I, 200). The virtues seem to have been related internally to the sphere in which they were active, since wisdom, for example, was justice only when it acted in regard to things to be distributed.

The use of internal relation in the philosophy of Aristo of Chios has been discussed at length by Rieth.<sup>5</sup> According to Plutarch, Aristo made virtue one in substance and called it health, but regarded the virtues as differentiated and several

<sup>3</sup> Hans Flach, *Glossen und Scholien zur Hesiodischen Theogonie* (Leipzig, 1876), p. 32. The passage is published as scholia number 134, page 223 in Flach's edition, and again in Arnim I, 100. The importance of this passage was called to my attention by Dr. F. Solmsen of Cornell University.

<sup>4</sup> I use the modern term internal relation to describe any relation which is such that a change in that to which the entity is related would affect the entity itself. For example, Whitehead's philosophy was internally related to Plato's philosophy, since, if Plato had not lived, Whitehead's philosophy would have been, of necessity, changed. On the other hand, Plato's philosophy was externally related to Whitehead's, since Plato's philosophy would not have been changed if Whitehead had not lived.

<sup>5</sup> Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-5.

because of their relation (τῷ πρὸς τί πως διαφόρους καὶ πλείονας), just as if one should call the seeing of white, white-seeing (λευκοθέα), and the seeing of black, black-seeing (μελανθέα). For instance, virtue which considers that which should be done and not be done is wisdom (φρόνησις); virtue restraining desire is moderation (I, 375). Galen's account of virtue in Aristo's philosophy differs slightly from that of Plutarch. He speaks of one virtue of the soul, the knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of good and evil, and regards each of the virtues as knowledge employed in a certain sphere (I, 374). He believes that Aristo recognized one virtue called by several names according to their relation (κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τι σχέσιν, III, 259; cf. I, 351). The virtues appear to have been internally related to that to which they were applied, and the term relative disposition seems to mean internal relation.<sup>6</sup>

Can we assume that the virtues in Zeno's philosophy were qualities, and that consequently all qualities were internally related? Here the evidence fails us. We know only that the virtues were corporeal causes. Zeno defined cause as that because of which something happens, and argued that cause was corporeal (σῶμα I, 89). He stated that wisdom (φρόνησις) was the cause of acting wisely (τὸ φρονεῖν), soul of living, and moderation (σωφροσύνη) of acting moderately (τὸ σωφρονεῖν). In Chrysippus' philosophy, however, the virtues were one aspect of the logos (II, 449), and, as such, both corporeal and qualities.<sup>7</sup> It is possible that Zeno's concept of virtue was essentially the same as that of Chrysippus, and that the virtues for Zeno also were qualities.

In his concept of relation Zeno was following the philosophic pattern of the time. Aristotle himself had conceived of relations as internal,<sup>8</sup> and Speusippus held that an entity was simply the sum of its relations.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Cleanthes' interpretation of the virtues was probably similar to that of Zeno and Aristo, cf. I, 563. For the virtues as qualities see my previous article, "The Stoic Concept of Quality," *A.J.P.*, LXXV (1954), p. 41.

<sup>7</sup> See my previous article, pp. 41-3.

<sup>8</sup> Aristotle argued that a change of relation could be brought about by the change of one term only. If one of the two terms were changed, the second, although itself unchanged, might become larger, smaller, or equal (1088 a 34-5; cf. 225 b 11-13).

<sup>9</sup> Arist., *Post. Anal.*, 97 a 6-22. See H. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the*

In Chrysippus' treatment of possibility there is clear evidence that he rejected internal relation.<sup>10</sup> He wrote that all that is capable of being, even if it is not going to be, is possible (II, 202).<sup>11</sup> His point of view is stated in a passage in Cicero which may be translated as follows: "You say that that which is not going to happen can happen, so that this precious stone may be broken, even if it will never be broken, and that it was not necessary for Cypselus to reign at Corinth, although this was stated by the oracle of Apollo a thousand years before."<sup>12</sup> "Being breakable" is a quality of the stone just as hot is a quality of fire, and cold of ice, and all quality is an aspect of the logos. The quality "being breakable" was externally related to its environment. It might be prevented by external circumstances from being actualized, but it was present in the entity whether it was actualized or not.

The second part of Cicero's statement is concerned with the problem of free will. Chrysippus distinguished between complete and initiating causes (II, 974, 994, and 997).<sup>13</sup> The former were connected with the disposition (ἕξις) of the entity, and controlled by the entity in which they were present (II, 974; cf. 991). The act of assent was regarded as a complete cause (II, 974; cf. 979 and 994). Cypselus was free to decide to rule or not to rule over Corinth; Oedipus was free to kill or not to kill Laius. It seems doubtful, however, whether Oedipus' power of deciding not to kill Laius was anything more than an unrealized possibility. The act of assent might never result in the action to which the assent was made because of outside circumstances (II, 991), since Cypselus, for example, might be prevented by his subjects from ruling over Corinth.

As Mates has pointed out in his monograph on Stoic Logic,

*Early Academy* (Univ. of California Press, 1945), p. 37, and *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* (Baltimore, 1944), I, pp. 59-62.

<sup>10</sup> For a discussion of possibility in Chrysippus, see Mates, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-1.

<sup>11</sup> II, 202: ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ γενέσθαι, κἂν μὴ μέλλῃ γενήσεσθαι, δυνατόν ἐστιν.

<sup>12</sup> Cic., *De Fato*, 13 = II, 954: *Tu et quae non sint futura, posse fieri dicis, ut frangi hanc gemmam, etiamsi id numquam futurum sit, neque necesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quamquam id millenimo ante anno Apollinis oraculo editum esset.*

<sup>13</sup> For the use of these terms see my previous article, pp. 43-4.

Chrysippus' theory of possibility appears to have been related to that of Philo of Megara.<sup>14</sup> Philo argued that a piece of wood at the bottom of the sea was combustible even if it would never be burned. Possibility was related to the nature of the entity.

Evidence regarding the Stoic categories of substratum and qualified is to be found in several fragments of Chrysippus dealing with the quality and the qualified entity. Substance (οὐσία) was the substratum, and two particular entities might be one substance. For instance, two doves were one substance but two qualified entities (Plut., *De Communibus Notitiis*, 1077 D-E = II, 396 and 1064).<sup>15</sup> The same interpretation seems to apply to psychology. According to Jamblichus, apprehension, the act of assent, impulse, and reason are qualities of the intelligence (II, 826).<sup>16</sup> Intelligence, therefore, was a substratum and substance qualified by apprehension, act of assent, impulse, and reason.

But a qualified entity such as an apple might be qualified by sweetness or fragrance (II, 826). Each qualified entity and each quality might be the substratum for another differentiation.

The virtues should, I believe, be interpreted in the same way. According to Galen, Chrysippus recognized only one faculty of the soul, reason (τὸ λογικόν, III, 259; cf. 257). It seems clear that this was the intelligence (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν). I think that we can assume that virtue was the intelligence in a certain disposition (ἡγεμονικόν πως ἔχον). This phrase is found in Sextus Empiricus (*Eth.*, II, 23), and we know that the concept was familiar to Chrysippus, since he described the soul as breath in a certain disposition (πνεῦμά πως ἔχον, II, 806). In that case, the intelligence was a substance qualified by each of the four virtues. All the virtues were one substance (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), but each virtue, in turn, as a substance was qualified.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Mates, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-1.

<sup>15</sup> See my previous article, p. 46.

<sup>16</sup> II, 826: ἐναι δὲ ιδιότητι ποιότητος περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενον ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μῆλον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι τὴν γλυκύτητα ἔχει καὶ τὴν εὐωδίαν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἐν ταῦτῳ φαντασίαν, συγκατάθεσιν, ὁρμὴν, λόγον συνείληφε.

<sup>17</sup> A virtue was both a quality (ποιότης, III, 255; cf. 259) and a substance. In *Concerning the Differentiation of the Virtues*, Chrysippus is said to have argued that the number of virtues and vices was due not to their relation, but to their peculiar substances being changed according to their qualities (ἐν ταῖς οικείαις οὐσίαις ὑπαλλασσόμεναις κατὰ

What was the nature of the substratum? In the examples which I have mentioned, the substratum included dove, apple, and intelligence. All of these are species, and we are probably right in assuming that they are also common qualities. Chrysippus (II, 147), Diogenes of Babylon (III, 22), and Antipater of Tarsus (III, 22) recognized as parts of speech the particular name (*ὄνομα*) and the common name (*προσηγορία*). The common name was defined by Diogenes as a part of speech indicating a common quality (*κοινὴ ποιότης*) such as man or horse; the particular name was a part of speech denoting a particular quality (*ιδία ποιότης*) as, for example, Diogenes and Socrates.

Since, however, the substratum cannot exist apart from the quality, it is not surprising to find that the genus is regarded by Chrysippus as an intelligible (*νοητόν*, II, 81), and that the common quality according to Simplicius is said to end in conception and property (*εἰς ἐννόημα καὶ ιδιότητα ἀπολήγουσαν*, Simpl., *In Arist. Cat.*, 222, 30=II, 378; cf. II, 278).

The term relative disposition (*πρός τί πως ἔχον*) designated a group of concepts which were internally related. It was applied by Chrysippus to the parts of the cosmos which are not complete in so far as they are in a certain relation to the whole (*τῷ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πως ἔχων*, II, 550), and was probably used for such terms as father, son, right, and left (II, 155). The concept of part was meaningless apart from that of whole, and father was meaningless without its correlative son. Since, as we have seen, the logos in Chrysippus' philosophy was externally related, I believe that relative disposition could never have been applied to quality in so far as it was a corporeal cause.<sup>18</sup>

*τὰς ποιότητας*, III, 259). We know also that in order to prove that the virtues were not one but many, Chrysippus argued in his book, *Concerning the Fact that the Virtues are Qualified*, that the verbal adjectives, to be chosen (*αἰρετέον*), to be done (*ποιητέον*), and to be confident (*θαρηγτέον*) each indicated a different good (III, 256). According to a passage in Plutarch, probably from the same source, Chrysippus related each virtue to its corresponding qualified entity (*ποιός*). Each virtue is formed by its own quality according to the qualified (*κατὰ τὸ ποῖον ἀρετὴν ἰδίᾳ ποιότητι συνίστασθαι*, III, 255). For example, from manly (*ἀνδρείος*) Chrysippus derived manliness (*ἀνδρεία*), and from gentle (*πρᾶος*) gentleness (*πραότης*, III, 255). Two verbal adjectives or two qualified entities seem to have indicated the existence of separate qualities.

<sup>18</sup> In a passage in Sextus Empiricus (*Eth.*, 22-7 = III, 75, and *Eth.*,

"Relative disposition" seems to have had various uses. It was applied by both Chrysippus and Posidonius to the contradictories.<sup>19</sup> Both philosophers argued that good and evil could not exist apart from each other. It may have been used also to describe the relationship between contrasting entities in a diaeresis which are qualified according to the differentia (ποιοὶ κατὰ διαφοράν). A paradox found in the fragments of Chrysippus may be paraphrased as follows: (II, 397): "Let us suppose that Dion is whole-limbed and that Theon has lost his foot, but that Dion, in turn, loses his foot. Then Dion becomes Theon, but two particular qualified entities cannot have the same substratum. Therefore, Dion remains but Theon is destroyed." I pointed out in my earlier article on quality that Theon is destroyed because his essence was due to the fact that he lacked what Dion possessed.<sup>20</sup> When Dion lost that particular quality which distinguished him from Theon, Theon disappeared. We should notice that whole-limbed (ὁλόκληρος) was a permanent and complete qualified entity (ποιός), and that whole-limbed and footless were two contrasting entities qualified according to the differentia (ποιοὶ κατὰ διαφοράν). The existence of one entity qualified according to the differentia seems to have depended upon the existence of one or more contrasting entities qualified according to the differentia.

40 and 46) the relationship of virtue (i. e. ποιότης) to the virtuous man (i. e. ποιός) is said to be that of part to whole. The Stoics defined the good as benefit and that which is not without benefit. They included as benefit virtue and the good action, and as not other than benefit the good man and the friend. The good man and the friend cannot be called benefit or other than benefit. For the parts are not the same as the whole nor different from the whole, just as the hand is not the same as the whole man, nor different from the whole man, for the whole man with the hand is considered to be a man. Since virtue is a part of the good man and of the friend, but the parts are not the same as the whole, nor different from the whole, the good man and the friend have been said to be not without benefit. On this passage, see Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-5.

<sup>19</sup> Chrysippus, II, 1169. For Posidonius, see D. L., VII, 91 (published by L. Edelstein, "The Philosophical System of Posidonius," *A. J. P.*, LVII [1936], p. 312, n. 105) which reads εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὴν κακίαν ὑπαρκτὴν διὰ τὸ ἀντικεῖσθαι τῇ ἀρετῇ. The ἀντικείμενα in Aristotle which included opposites and relations (*Topics*, 105 b 34; cf. 109 b 17) were regarded as ἅμα τῇ φύσει (142 a 24).

<sup>20</sup> See my previous article, pp. 46-7.



The principle that one differentia cannot exist apart from another differentia is not original with the Stoics. It was used by Aristotle and termed by him "inseparable by nature" (*ἄμα τῇ φύσει*). This phrase is defined in the *Diaeresis of Aristotle* as indicating those things which destroy one another and are not able to exist without one another, such as the double and the half.<sup>21</sup> It is clear, however, from Aristotle's *Topics* that the use of the term was not confined to relations of the kind, double and half. Aristotle argued that every genus is divided by differentiae distinguished logically,<sup>22</sup> and, again, that all things distinguished logically from the same genus are inseparable by nature (*ἄμα τῇ φύσει*).<sup>23</sup>

In these passages from Chrysippus we have found evidence for the four Stoic categories, although it is perhaps incorrect to call them categories at this stage of Stoic philosophy. For instance, the two concepts of substratum and disposition (*πὺς ἔχον*) were required by Chrysippus' analysis of entities into a substratum in a certain disposition. The terms disposition and relative disposition referred to certain kinds of qualifications present in the substratum. Since relative dispositions were internally related, it is possible that disposition referred to any qualification which was externally related (e.g. sweet or three-sided). The word "qualified" (*πούς*) seems to be used in Simplicius and Plotinus to indicate a particular qualified entity. Its meaning may depend ultimately upon Chrysippus' distinction between the common and the particular quality.<sup>24</sup>

Although the division between Logic and Metaphysics is clearly drawn in Stoic philosophy, the structure of Stoic Logic reflects that of their Metaphysics. For instance, the hierarchy of

<sup>21</sup> V. Rose, *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus* (Leipzig, 1863), p. 694, ch. 66. On this passage see E. Hambruch, *Logische Regeln der Platonischen Schule in der Aristotelischen Topik* (*Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Jahresberichte des Askanischen Gymnasiums zu Berlin*, 1904), pp. 6 and 11.

<sup>22</sup> *Topics*, 143 a 36: *πᾶν γένος διαιρεῖται ταῖς ἀντιδιηρημέναις διαφοραῖς*.

<sup>23</sup> *Topics*, 142 b 8: *ἄμα τῇ φύσει τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ἀντιδιηρημένα*; cf. *Cat.*, 14 b 33-9. On *ἄμα τῇ φύσει* see H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism*, I, p. 25, n. 19.

<sup>24</sup> For a further discussion of disposition see below, p. 81, and M. Pohlenz, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 69-70 and II, pp. 40-1; for disposition and relative disposition see below, pp. 77 and 82; for the qualified, see below, pp. 78 ff.

substrata and differentiae which is so obvious in their *Metaphysics* is apparent in their definition and diaeresis also.<sup>25</sup>

The definition was defined by Chrysippus as the stating of that which is characteristic (*ἡ τοῦ ἰδίου ἀπόδοσις*, II, 226; cf. *Antipater*, III, 24). There are obviously two types of definition. First, a definition such as, "Man is a rational, mortal animal" (II, 224). In this, man is the species, rational and mortal are differentiae (*ἰδια*), and animal is the genus or common quality. In other words, animal (the genus) is the substratum (*ὑποκείμενον*) qualified by the differentia mortal (*ἰδιος*). Again, we might have a definition such as, "Diogenes is a white man." Here, Diogenes is the particular (*ὄνομα*), white the differentia (*ἰδιος*) and man the species or common quality (*προσηγορία*). In this, the species (man) is the substratum qualified by the differentia white.

The Stoic definition and diaeresis are based on hypothetical and disjunctive propositions respectively. For example, according to Sextus Empiricus (II, 224), a sentence such as "Man is a mortal, rational animal" is the equivalent of "If anything is a man, it is a mortal, rational animal." Similarly, a sentence such as "of men some are Greeks, and others barbarians," becomes the disjunctive proposition, "If there are men, they are either Greeks or barbarians."<sup>26</sup>

Although the following example is not found in a fragment of Chrysippus, it is a good illustration of the nature of Stoic diaeresis (Sextus, *M.*, II, 242 = II, 65). "Of apprehensions . . . some are plausible, others implausible, others plausible and implausible, others neither plausible nor implausible. Plausible are those which produce a mild agreement in the soul, as, for example, that it is day now and I am talking. Implausible are those which are not of this kind but keep us from assent, for instance, "If it is day, there is not a sun above the earth," or "If there is darkness, it is day." Plausible and implausible are those which according to their relation are sometimes of such a kind, and sometimes of another kind, as, for example, riddles; but neither plausible nor implausible are, for instance, the ap-

<sup>25</sup> On Stoic definition and diaeresis, see Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-54.

<sup>26</sup> Compare II, 217 τὰς (sc. προτάσεις) κατὰ διαίρεσιν διεξευγμένα. For the distinction between diaeresis, antidiaeresis, and hypodiaeresis see Diogenes of Babylon (III, 25; cf. II, 224).

prehensions of such things as "The stars are even," or "The stars are odd." Of the plausible or implausible apprehensions some are true, other false, others true and false, others neither true nor false."

The diaeresis is based entirely on the disjunctive proposition (either—or). Negatives are used in making the division and the parts of the diaeresis are equated with definitions. The nominalistic character of the diaeresis is clear.

Since every division in the diaeresis is made by the use of disjunctive propositions, each step has ontologically a higher value than the one before. For instance, in the diaeresis above, we have in successive steps apprehensions (*φαντασίαι*), plausible apprehensions (*πιθαναὶ φαντασίαι*), and true, plausible apprehensions (*ἀληθεῖς πιθαναὶ φαντασίαι*). Each step adds a new differentia to that which is already differentiated. The structure of the diaeresis parallels the hierarchy of substrata and differentiations in *Metaphysics*.

I would like to turn now to a consideration of two long but important passages in Simplicius' *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories* (165, 32-166, 29 = II, 403 and 212, 12-213, 7 = II, 390).<sup>27</sup> For convenience, I shall include a translation of the text. The numbers refer to the line numbers in von Arnim's collection of the fragments, and are placed at the beginning of the line.<sup>28</sup>

Simpl., *In Arist. Cat.*, 165, 32-166, 29 = II, 403:

"The Stoics instead of one genus number two in this topic, placing some in relations (*ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τι*), others in relative dispositions (*ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τί πως ἔχουσι*). And they distinguish logically relations from the self-subsistent (*τοῖς καθ' αὐτά*), and relative dispositions from that which is according to the differentia (*τοῖς κατὰ διαφοράν*), calling relations the sweet and the bitter and whatever disposes in such a way,<sup>29</sup> and calling relative dispositions such things as right, father, etc. They term according to the differentia that which is characterized according to some species. Just as our own concept of the self-subsistent is different from our concept

<sup>27</sup> For a discussion of these passages see Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-9 and 70-84.

<sup>28</sup> On the manuscript tradition see Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 22 and 70.

<sup>29</sup> Von Arnim's text differs at several points from the later edition of Kalbfleisch. Von Arnim, *καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ὅσα*; Kalbfleisch, *τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅσα*.

of that which is according to the differentia, so relations are different from relative dispositions (30), but the order of the conjunctions is inverted (*ἀντεστραμμένη δέ ἐστι τῶν συζυγιῶν ἢ ἀκολουθία*). For that which is according to the differentia co-exists (*συνπαράχει*) with the self-subsistent. The self-subsistent have some differentiations (*διαφοράς*), as, for example, white and black. Yet the self-subsistent do not co-exist with that which is according to the differentia. The sweet and bitter have differentiations according to which they are characterized, yet they are not self-subsistent but relations. Relative dispositions, which are contradictory (*ἀντίκειται*) to that which is according to the differentia (35), are at any rate relations also. For right and father are not only in a certain disposition (or in a relative disposition),<sup>30</sup> but are also relations. Sweet and bitter, being relations, are according to the differentia; but relative dispositions are contrary (*ἐναντία*) to that which is according to the differentia. For it was impossible for relative dispositions to be self-subsistent or according to the differentia, for they depended upon their relation to something else only (*ἐκ γὰρ τῆς πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσεως ἡρτῆται μόνης*) (40). Nevertheless, relations are not self-subsistent, for they are not separable, but will certainly be according to the differentia, for they are observed with some stamp (*χαρακτῆρος*). But if it is necessary to rephrase what has been said, they call relations those things, which, being disposed according to their own stamp, incline towards something else, and relative dispositions, those things which naturally happen (*συμβαίνειν*) and do not happen without any change and alteration concerning themselves (45), while having regard to the external, so that whenever anything disposed according to the differentia inclines towards something else, this will be relation only, as, for example, (p. 133, 1) disposition, science, and perception. But whenever it is observed not according to the existing differentia, but according to its bare relation to something else, it will be relative disposition, for son and right hand have need of something external for their existence (*πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν*). Therefore, even if there were no change concerning them, father would no longer exist if the son were dead (5), nor would the right hand exist if the corresponding hand (*τοῦ παρακειμένου*) changed. But sweet and bitter would not be different, unless the power in them (*ἢ περὶ αὐτὰ δύναμις*) should change. If they change, although they

<sup>30</sup> Von Arnim and Kalbfleisch, *μετὰ τοῦ πῶς ἔχειν*; Rieth, *op. cit.*, p. 70 suggests *μετὰ τοῦ πρὸς τί πῶς ἔχειν*.

themselves are not affected in any way, according to the relation of something else to them, clearly they have their existence in their relation only, and not according to the differentia, I mean, relative dispositions."

Simpl., *In Arist. Cat.*, 212-12-213, 7 = II, 390 (p. 128, 31):

"Some of the Stoics, defining the qualified (τὸ ποιόν) in three ways, say that two kinds (i. e. of qualified) are wider than quality (τῆς ποιότητος); but they declare that one or part of one is commensurate with it (συναπαρτίζειν αὐτῇ). For they say that the qualified, described generally, is everything which is according to the differentia whether it is in a state of movement or rest (εἴτε κινούμενον εἴη εἴτε ἐχόμενον), and whether it is hard to analyze or easy to analyze (καὶ εἴτε δυσαναλύτως εἴτε εὐαναλύτως ἔχει). According to this, not only the wise man and the boxer, but the runner also is qualified. In their second classification they did not include movement, but only conditions (τὰς σχέσεις). They defined this as that which is in a certain condition according to the differentia (τὸ ἰσχόμενον κατὰ διαφοράν), as, for example the wise man and the man who has been posted in an advanced position. (But they introduced a third type of qualified, corresponding particularly to the species [εἰδικώτατον ποιόν], in which they did not include those who were not permanently disposed [τοὺς μὴ ἐμμόνως ἰσχομένους], nor were the boxer and the man who has been posted in an advanced position qualified according to them.)<sup>31</sup> And of those which were permanently disposed according to the differentia some are such in a manner commensurate with the expression and the concept (οἱ μὲν ἀπηρτισμένως κατὰ τὴν ἐκφορὰν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπινόιαν εἰσι τοιοῦτοι), and others are not. They rejected the latter, but they called those which were commensurate and permanent according to the differentia qualified. . . . Although the qualified, therefore, is said to be of three kinds, the quality (ποιότης), according to the last kind of qualified, is commensurate with the qualified (συναπαρτίζει πρὸς τὸ ποιόν). Therefore, when they define the quality as a disposition of the qualified (σχέσιν ποιού), we must understand by this definition that the third kind of quality is meant. For in one way only the quality is described by the Stoics, but in three ways the qualified."

In the first passage which I translated above (II, 403), four classifications of being are mentioned, the self-subsistent (τὰ καθ' αὐτά), that which is according to the differentia (τὰ κατὰ

<sup>31</sup> The Greek for this sentence is printed by Kalbfleisch but is not in von Arnim.

διαφοράν), relations (τὰ πρὸς τι), and relative dispositions (τὰ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα). Although these are not categories, they cast light on the nature of the categories.

As Rieth has pointed out, the term self-subsistent (τὰ καθ' αὐτά) probably refers to the particular qualified entity.<sup>32</sup>

The phrase "that which is according to the differentia" (τὰ κατὰ διαφοράν) has a very wide application. It is defined as that which is characterized according to some species (II, 403, 27). As examples, Simplicius names differentiations such as white and black (31), and sweet and bitter (36), and qualities, as, for example, disposition, science, and perception (46). The last three are said to be disposed according to the differentia (κατὰ διαφοράν τι διακείμενον). Included in "that which is according to the differentia" also are the three kinds of particular qualified entities (ποιός, II, 390), which are classified as (1) that which is in a state of movement according to the differentia, e. g. the runner; (2) that which is in a certain condition according to the differentia, e. g. the man who has been posted in an advanced position; and (3) that which is permanent according to the differentia, e. g. the scholar. The third group alone is commensurate with the quality.<sup>33</sup>

The hierarchy of substrata and differentiae which we have already discussed in Chrysippus is found again in Simplicius (II, 403). Not only the self-subsistent (τὰ καθ' αὐτά) but such terms as sweet and bitter are said to have differentiae according to which they are characterized (33). What would be the differentia of sweet? Perhaps degrees of more or less or the peculiar sweetness of one species (e. g. sugar) as contrasted with that of another (e. g. honey).

According to Simplicius that which is according to the differentia co-exists with the self-subsistent, but the self-subsistent does not co-exist with that which is according to the differentia (II, 403, 30-2). The meaning of these sentences is clear. The self-subsistent may be white or black (i. e. have "that which is

<sup>32</sup> Rieth, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

<sup>33</sup> For further discussion of this passage see Rieth, pp. 22-9. A. Schmekel, *Die positive Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, I (Berlin, 1938), p. 625, attributed the passage to Antipater of Tarsus. Compare Simpl., *In Arist. Cat.*, 214, 24-215, 2 = II, 391, where it is stated that all bodies are qualified but only bodies which are unified have quality.

according to the differentia”), but its existence does not depend upon its being white or black. White or black, on the other hand, cannot exist apart from that which is self-subsistent.

As examples of relation (*τὰ πρὸς τι*) Simplicius names sweet and bitter (25), disposition (*ἕξις*), science (*ἐπιστήμη*), and perception (*αἴσθησις*, 46). He states specifically that sweet and bitter are powers (*δυνάμεις*). They would not change unless their power should change (p. 133, 6; cf. p. 132, 25-6). Qualities had been recognized as powers by Chrysippus. They were corporeal causes of predicates. For example, moderation is the cause of acting moderately (Zeno, I, 89: *διὰ τὸ σωφροσύνην τὸ σωφρονεῖν*).<sup>34</sup> It is reasonable to suppose that sweet and bitter were powers because they were a cause affecting something external to themselves. Bitter was a sensible acting upon its opposite sweet. Relations of this kind were recognized by both Plato and Aristotle.<sup>35</sup>

Rieth has drawn attention to the words, “sweet and bitter and such things which dispose in such a way” (25: *τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅσα τοιῶσδε διατίθῃσι*), and has argued that they are relations (*πρὸς τι*) because they dispose the substratum in a certain way.<sup>36</sup> The whole passage, however, may be translated as follows: “calling relations sweet and bitter and such things which dispose in such a way, and relative dispositions such things as right hand and father.” In other words, the first group are relations not because they qualify the substratum, but

<sup>34</sup> See my previous article, pp. 41-2.

<sup>35</sup> Plato referred to hot and cold as relations in *Rep.*, 438 C-D. Aristotle's classification of relation was threefold. He names as one class, that which is according to excess and deficiency (200 b 29), such as the double and the half, and generally the multiple and the divided (1020 b 26-8). A second division included the active and the passive (200 b 30-2), such as that which can heat and that which can be heated, and that which can cut and that which is cut (1020 b 29-30). This second class is said to be according to the *δύναμις* (1021 a 15-9). A third class included the relation of that which is measured to measure, and that which is known to knowledge (1020 b 31-2; cf. 1021 a 29-1021 b 2), or the reverse of this, knowledge to that which is known (1056 b 36). So far as I can determine, Aristotle referred to this classification as *πρὸς τι* or *πρὸς τί πως ἔχον* without making any distinction between the terms. If we compare the Stoic classification with that of Aristotle, we find that class one of Aristotle's division has become *πρὸς τί πως ἔχον* and classes two and three *πρὸς τι*.

<sup>36</sup> Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-84. For the reading see above, note 29.

because they qualify the substratum in a different way from the relative dispositions. What was the difference between the two kinds of relation? The latter, as we have seen, was an internal relation. Can we say that relations were powers externally related to their environment? This would accord well with the concept of qualities as powers suggested in Chrysippus' account of possibility.<sup>37</sup>

Simplicius' discussion of relative disposition (*πρός τί πως ἔχον*) adds little to what we have already found in Chrysippus. It includes right, left, father, and son. Such terms were always internal relations. They depended entirely upon their relation to something else (39), and they were such that they naturally happened and did not happen without any change and alteration concerning themselves (44).

Can we equate Simplicius' classification of being with the four Stoic categories? To this the answer must be in the negative. The self-subsistent appears to correspond to the qualified (*ποιός*), but that which is according to the differentia includes not only disposition (*πὸς ἔχον*) but qualities and qualified entities (*ποιός*). The classification relation (*πρός τι*) cannot be connected with the categories at all. It is used to describe the qualities and differentiae only in so far as they were powers. Only in the case of relative disposition can we find any real parallel between the two classifications.

In the Sixth Book of the *Enneades* Plotinus gives us a detailed criticism of the Stoic system of categories. Since the passage is long, I shall paraphrase the first sections and include a translation of the later sections only.

The discussion opens with the argument that, since substratum is prior to the other categories and all categories are under one genus *τι*, both prior and posterior must be under one genus, but this is absurd (VI, 1, 25). Again, if the Stoics classify matter as prior, they are assuming that that which is potential is prior to that which is actual (VI, 1, 26).

The priority of matter according to Plotinus raises problems concerning the relation between God and matter (VI, 1, 26). If matter is prior, God would be posterior to matter. If his body is composed from matter (*ὕλη*) and form (*εἶδος*), where would form come from? If then he is without matter, as a first prin-

<sup>37</sup> See above, p. 66.



ciple God would be incorporeal logos and the active would be incorporeal. If he is composite in substance without matter, since he is body, he must have a matter peculiar to himself.

The meaning of the term body in Stoic philosophy is the basis of the next objection (VI, 1, 26). How can matter, if it is body, be a first principle, since every body is a composite of matter and quality? If three-dimensioned is common in the case of body, they mean mathematical body, but if it is three-dimensioned with resistance, body will not be one.

The discussion at this point turns again to the nature of God (VI, 1, 27). If God is composite and posterior, as matter in a certain disposition (*ἄλλῃ πως ἔχουσα*), and if he is a substratum, there must be something external to the substratum, which, acting upon it, will make it a substratum. But if God is himself a substratum with the matter, of what will they be the substrata?

The substratum is said to be a relation in regard to that which acts upon it (VI, 1, 27). If it does not need anything external to it, but can become all things, by changing its form, it would no longer be a substratum but all things.

Further, it is absurd to hold that the matter, that is, the substratum, is substance, but that bodies are not substances (VI, 1, 27). The cosmos, for instance, would not be substance except in so far as part of it is substance.

Plotinus' discussion of the qualified (*ποιά*) may be translated as follows (VI, 1, 29-30):

"They say that it is necessary for the qualified (*τὰ ποιά*) to be different from the substrata (*τὰ ὑποκείμενα*) for otherwise they would not have numbered it second. If, then, they are different, they must be simple also; if they are simple, they must not be composite; if they are not composite, they must not have matter either, in so far as they are qualified (*ποιά*); if they do not have matter, they must be incorporeal and active, for matter is a substratum for them (*ὑπόκειται*), in so far as they are acted upon. But if they are composite, first the division is absurd, since it distinguishes the simple and the composite, even though they are under one genus, placing one in one species (*ἐν θατέρῳ τῶν εἰδῶν*), another in another, just as if, dividing science, one should call part grammar and part grammar and something else.

But if they should say that the qualified (*τὰ ποιά*) is qualified matter (*ἕλην ποιάν*), first the *λόγοι* which are im-

manent in matter (*ἐνυλοι*), although they are not material (*ἐν ὕλῃ*), will make something composite, but prior to the composite, which they make, they will be composed of matter and form (*εἶδους*). Surely, therefore, they themselves are not forms nor *λόγοι*. But if they should say that the *λόγοι* are nothing except matter in a certain disposition (*ὕλην πως ἔχουσιν*), they will obviously term the qualified dispositions (*πὺς ἔχοντα*), and they should place them in the fourth genus.

But if this disposition (*σχέσις*) is different, what is the difference? Or is it clear that the disposition (*τό πως ἔχειν*) here is more of a substance (*ὑπόστασις*)? And yet if it is not a substance there also, why do they number it as one genus or species (*εἶδος*)? For being and not being cannot be under the same (genus or species). But what is this disposition in matter (*τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ ὕλῃ πως ἔχον*)? Surely it is being or not being. And if being, it is certainly incorporeal; but if not being, it is mentioned in vain, and matter (*ὕλη*) only is being, and the qualified (*τὸ ποιόν*) is not anything. And neither is the disposition (*τό πως ἔχον*), for it is all the more not being. The fourth category which has been mentioned, much more so, for only matter is being. . . .

In regard to the dispositions (*ἐν δὲ τοῖς πως ἔχουσιν*) it is absurd perhaps to place dispositions third, or whatever the order is, since all dispositions are concerned with matter (VI, 1, 30). But they will say that there is a difference among dispositions, and that the matter is affected in one way here and there, and in another way in the dispositions, and that the qualified (*τὰ ποιὰ*) are in a certain disposition in regard to the matter (*περὶ τὴν ὕλην πως ἔχοντα*), and the particular dispositions in regard to the qualified (*τὰ ἰδίως δέ πως ἔχοντα περὶ τὰ ποιὰ*). But since the qualified themselves are nothing, except matter in a certain disposition, the dispositions again revert to the matter and will be concerned with the matter."

Many of Plotinus' arguments are not very significant, since he uses concepts which the Stoics themselves did not use. The Stoics, for instance, so far as I have been able to determine, did not distinguish between the prior and the posterior, or between potentiality and actuality, and yet it is these concepts which form the basis of Plotinus' criticism in the first sections (VI, 1, 25-6). In discussing the relation of matter and God, Plotinus distinguishes between matter and form (VI, 1, 26-7). Here too he departs from Stoic doctrine, since the Stoics did not recognize

the existence of form (I, 65 and 494; II, 278 and 365), but regarded matter and quality as inseparable.<sup>38</sup>

In the course of his discussion Plotinus argues that if God is substratum he must be matter in a certain disposition (*ἡλὴ πως ἔχουσα*, VI, 1, 27). He maintains also that, if the qualified (*τὰ ποιὰ*) is qualified matter (*ἡλὴν ποιάν*), the *λόγοι* which are immanent in matter, although they are not material, will consist of matter and form (VI, 1, 29). Plotinus is assuming throughout that the substratum of God or logos is matter, and fails to recognize the fact that substratum in Stoic philosophy may be either an unqualified substratum, a common quality (i.e. the genus or species), or a particular qualified entity (cf. von Arnim, II, 374). God could properly be called substratum in a certain disposition since he was a *πνεῦμά πως ἔχον*, but the *πνεῦμα*, as a substratum, was quality rather than matter.<sup>39</sup> Plotinus is right in believing that the substratum was recognized as substance (VI, 1, 27), since Chrysippus, as we have seen, regarded the common quality, which was also the substratum, as substance,<sup>40</sup> but wrong in identifying the substratum with matter.

Plotinus' argument that if God is a substratum there must be something external to the substratum which will act upon it (VI, 1, 27) rests on a misunderstanding of Stoic philosophy. The active power was in the logos itself working out from within. God, we are told, runs through matter as honey through the honeycomb (I, 155).

When Plotinus asks, if God is a substratum, of what will he be the substratum, he may be answered easily (VI, 1, 27). God like all quality was a substratum for further differentiations, and these in turn, as differentiations, were a manifestation of the logos. If Plotinus is correct in using the logos as an example of the qualified (*ποιός*, VI, 1, 29), we might assume that the Stoics classified the logos or quality (*ποιότης*) under the wider term qualified (*ποιός*).

Plotinus' interpretation of the Stoic concept of body (*σῶμα*) is also questionable. As I pointed out in my earlier article, the term seems to have designated a capacity to act or be acted upon,

<sup>38</sup> See my previous article, pp. 51-2.

<sup>39</sup> For quality as a substratum, see above, p. 67.

<sup>40</sup> See above, p. 68.

and not a three-dimensioned body or a three-dimensioned body with resistance.<sup>41</sup>

In conclusion I shall try to summarize what can be determined regarding the meaning of the four categories. The two categories, substratum (*ὑποκείμενον*) and qualified (*ποιός*) may go back to Chrysippus' distinction between the common and particular quality. The common quality was the unqualified substratum, which was usually the genus or species; the particular quality was the qualified entity (cf. II, 374). In that case, both the substratum and the qualified entity were substrata subject to further differentiation. So far as I have been able to discover from passages in von Arnim the word "qualified" always denoted a particular qualified entity.<sup>42</sup> As a particular kind of substratum, it was not further analyzed into substratum and disposition.

There are two possible meanings for the term disposition (*πὼς ἔχον*) "making its substratum in a certain disposition" or "being in a certain disposition." According to Rieth, disposition referred to the quality as making its substratum in a certain disposition.<sup>43</sup> He maintained that such things as disposition (*ἔξις*), science (*ἐπιστήμη*), and perception (*αἴσθησις*) were *πνεύματά πως ἔχοντα* (II, 379, 132, and 71), giving matter its quality. From the sentence in Simplicius which refers to sweet and bitter and those things which dispose in a certain way (165, 35 = II, 403, 25: *τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅσα τοιῶσδε διατίθουσιν*), Rieth concluded that sweet and bitter also were *πὼς ἔχοντα* which make the matter "disposed according to the differentia."

If Rieth was right in assuming that disposition meant "making its substratum in a certain disposition," the phrase should be applied to the differentiation and not to the substratum, but this does not seem to be the case. In all the examples that I have been able to find, disposition refers to the quality only when the quality is itself a substratum for another differentiation.

There is no doubt that all the qualities were *πνεύματά πως ἔχοντα*. This is attested particularly by a fragment of Chrysippus which states that the dispositions (*ἔξεις*) were air, and that air

<sup>41</sup> See my previous article, p. 57.

<sup>42</sup> For *ποιός* see II, 173, 175, 323a, 369, 391, 624; III, 255.

<sup>43</sup> Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-84.

caused each of those things which were organized under one disposition to be qualified (II, 449). But Chrysippus argued also that each quality was a particular qualified substance corresponding to its co-ordinate qualified entity or predicate.<sup>44</sup> The qualities were not all one but each was a particular qualified *πνεῦμα*. It seems likely, therefore, that justice was a *πνεῦμα* qualified in a certain way, and courage was a *πνεῦμα* qualified in another way. In that case, the *πνεῦμα* would be a quality which as a substratum was further differentiated.

If we are right in assuming that disposition means "in a certain disposition," it would reasonably include not only the relations, such as sweet and bitter, but differentiae which are not active, as, for example, white and black (II, 403).

Both disposition (*πὸς ἔχον*) and relative disposition (*πρὸς τί πὸς ἔχον*) were differentiations of the substratum, and as differentiations they were manifestations of the *λόγος* or *πνεῦμα*. The differentiation might be externally or internally related to something external to itself. If it were externally related, it was disposition; if it was internally related, it was relative disposition.

What was the role of the four categories, substratum, qualified, disposition, and relative disposition in Stoic philosophy? It is clear, I believe, that the first two were substrata, and the last two, differentiations.

MARGARET E. REESOR.

THE WOMAN'S COLLEGE OF  
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA.

---

<sup>44</sup> See above, note 17.